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Abstract—Deep neural networks can easily be fooled by an adversary with minuscule perturbations added to an input image. The
existing defense techniques suffer greatly under white-box attack settings, where an adversary has full knowledge of the network and
can iterate several times to find strong perturbations. We observe that the main reason for the existence of such vulnerabilities is the
close proximity of different class samples in the learned feature space of deep models. This allows the model decisions to be
completely changed by adding an imperceptible perturbation to the inputs. To counter this, we propose to class-wise disentangle the
intermediate feature representations of deep networks, specifically forcing the features for each class to lie inside a convex polytope
that is maximally separated from the polytopes of other classes. In this manner, the network is forced to learn distinct and distant
decision regions for each class. We observe that this simple constraint on the features greatly enhances the robustness of learned
models, even against the strongest white-box attacks, without degrading the classification performance on clean images. We report
extensive evaluations in both black-box and white-box attack scenarios and show significant gains in comparison to state-of-the-art
defenses.
Index Terms—Adversarial defense, adversarial robustness, white-box attack, distance metric learning, deep supervision.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
D EEP Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) models caneasily be fooled by adversarial examples containing
small, human-imperceptible perturbations specifically de-
signed by an adversary [1], [2], [3]. Such adversarial exam-
ples pose a serious threat to security critical applications,
e.g. autonomous cars [4], bio-metric identification [5] and
surveillance systems [6]. Furthermore, if a slight perturba-
tion added to a benign input drastically changes the deep
network’s output with high-confidence, this implies that our
current models are not distinctively learning the underlying
fundamental visual concepts. Therefore, designing robust
deep networks goes a long way towards developing reliable
and trustworthy artificial intelligence systems.
Numerous defense methods have recently been pro-
posed in the literature to mitigate adversarial attacks. These
can be broadly classified into two categories: (a) Reactive de-
fenses that modify the inputs during testing time, using im-
age transformations to counter the effect of adversarial per-
turbations [7], [8], [9], [10], and (b) Proactive defenses that alter
the underlying model’s architecture or learning procedure,
e.g., by adding more layers, using ensemble/adversarial
training or changing the loss/activation functions [11], [12],
[13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18]. Proactive defenses are gener-
ally more valued, as they provide relatively better robust-
ness against white-box attacks. However, iterative white-box
adversaries pose a challenge for both proactive and reactive
defenses [19].
This paper introduces a novel distance based training
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procedure, ‘Prototype Conformity Loss’, as a proactive defense
against adversarial attacks, which seeks to maximally sep-
arate the learned feature representations at multiple depth
levels of the deep model (from hereon referred to as ‘Deep
Supervision’). We note that the addition of perturbations in
the input domain leads to a corresponding polytope in the
high-dimensional manifold of the intermediate features and
the output classification space. Based upon this observation,
we propose to maximally separate the polytopes for dif-
ferent class samples, such that there is a minimal overlap
between any two classes in the decision and intermediate
feature space. This ensures that an adversary can no longer
fool the network within a restricted perturbation budget. In
other words, we build on the intuition that two different
class samples, which are visually dissimilar in the input
domain, must be mapped to different regions in the output
space. Therefore, we must also enforce that their feature
representations are well separated along the hierarchy of
network layers. This is achieved by improving within-class
proximities and enhancing between-class differences of the
activation maps, along multiple levels of the deep model. As
illustrated in Fig. 1, the penultimate layer features learnt by
the proposed scheme are well separated and hard to pene-
trate compared with the easily attacked features learnt using
the standard softmax loss without any deep supervision.
Our approach provides strong evidence towards the
notion that the adversarial perturbations exist not only due
to the properties of data (e.g. high-dimensionality) and net-
work architectures (e.g. non-linearity functions) but are also
greatly influenced by the choice of objective functions used
for optimization. Our primary claim is that the distance-
based objectives are better suited for learning robust mod-
els compared to the commonly used cross-entropy loss.
Among such objectives, we demonstrate that our proposed
approach provides the best performance, while being highly
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Fig. 1: 2D penultimate
layer activations of a
clean image and its
adversarial counterpart
(PGD attack) for stan-
dard softmax trained
model and our method
on MNIST (top row) and
CIFAR-10 (bottom row)
datasets. Note that our
method correctly maps
the attacked image to its
true-class feature space.
efficient. To this end, we propose a deeply supervised multi-
layered loss based defense which provides a significant
boost in robustness under the strictest attack conditions,
where the balance is shifted heavily towards the adversary.
These include white-box attacks and iterative adversaries in-
cluding the strongest first-order attack (Projected Gradient
Descent). We evaluate the robustness of our proposed de-
fense through extensive evaluations on five publicly avail-
able datasets and achieve a robustness of 46.7% and 36.1%
against the strongest PGD attack ( = 0.03) for the CIFAR-
10 and CIFAR-100 datasets, respectively. To the best of our
knowledge, these are significantly higher levels of robust-
ness against a broad range of adversarial attacks.
Our empirical evaluations (Sec. 6) demonstrate that the
proposed method provides an effective and robust defense,
significantly outperforming current state-of-the-art defenses
under both white-box and black-box settings. Adversarial ex-
amples have been shown to exhibit the surprising property
of being highly transferable [2], [20], i.e. given two classifica-
tion models trained on either the same or different datasets,
the adversarial samples generated using one model often
succeed in fooling the other model (without having any
information about the latter). Motivated by this observation,
we perform a transferability test to show the robustness of
our technique under extreme black-box settings (i.e., a trans-
fer attack). Specifically, using adversarial examples gener-
ated from various models trained via diverse schemes as
source models, we demonstrate that our approach defends
against transfer attacks to a great extent. In addition, we
experimentally show that our method does not suffer from
the gradient masking effect [19], which makes defenses
vulnerable to black-box attacks.
A preliminary version of this work appeared in [21].
In addition, the current paper includes: (1) a systematic
study and comparison of the proposed defense framework
with other popular distance-based loss functions (center
[22], contrastive [23] and triplet loss [24]), (2) additional
experimental and architecture details, (3) new visualizations
to illustrate the learning process, (4) experiments with the
more challenging ‘adaptive white-box’ setting and (5) timing
and efficiency comparisons between several distance-based
objective functions.
2 RELATED WORK
Generating adversarial examples to fool a deep network and
developing defenses against such examples have recently
gained significant research attention. Adversarial perturba-
tions were first proposed by Szegedy et al. [1] using an L-
BFGS based optimization scheme, followed by the Fast Gra-
dient Sign Method (FGSM) [2] and its iterative variant [12].
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [25] then proposed DeepFool, which
iteratively projects an image across the decision boundary
(in the form of a polyhydron) until it crosses the boundary
and is misclassified. One of the strongest attacks proposed
recently is the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [17], which
takes maximum loss increments allowed within a specified
l∞ norm-ball. Other popular attacks include the Carlini and
Wagner Attack [26], Jacobian-based Saliency Map Approach
[27], Momentum Iterative Attack [28] and Diverse Input
Iterative Attack [29].
Two main lines of defense mechanisms have been pro-
posed in the literature to counter adversarial attacks. The
first involves applying different pre-processing steps and
transformations on the input image at inference time [9],
[30]. The second category of defenses improve a network’s
training regime to counter adversarial attacks. An effective
scheme in this regards is adversarial training, where the
model is jointly trained with clean images and their adver-
sarial counterparts [2], [31]. Ensemble adversarial training
was used in [11] to soften the classifier’s decision bound-
aries. Virtual Adversarial Training [32] smoothes the model
distribution using a regularization term. Papernot et al.
[13] used distillation to improve the model’s robustness
by retraining it with soft labels. Parsevel Networks [14]
restrict the Lipschitz constant of each layer of the model.
Input Gradient Regularizer [33] penalizes the change in a
model’s prediction w.r.t. input perturbations by regularizing
the gradient of the cross-entropy loss. The Frobenius norm
of the Jacobian of the network was shown to improve a
model’s stability in [34]. [35] proposed a defensive quanti-
zation method to control the Lipschitz constant of the net-
work and mitigate the adversarial noise during inference.
[36] proposed Stochastic Activation Pruning as a defense
against adversarial attacks. Min-Max Optimization [17] is
one of the strongest defense methods, which augments the
training data with first order attacked samples. Despite
significant research activity in devising defenses against
adversarial attacks, it was recently shown in [19] that the
3current defenses are successfully circumvented under white-
box settings. Further, many of the existing defenses, e.g.
thermometer encoding [37], stochastic activation pruning
[36] mitigating through randomization [9] and DefenseGAN
[38], obfuscate gradients. Only Min-Max optimization [17]
and Cascade adversarial machine learning [39] retained 47%
and 15% accuracy respectively on the CIFAR-10 dataset, and
withstood attacks under white-box settings. In our experi-
ments (see Sec. 6), we extensively compare our results with
[17] and make a compelling case by achieving significant
improvements.
At the core of our defense are the proposed objective
function and multi-level deep supervision, which ensure
feature space discrimination between classes. A classifica-
tion model trained with the standard Softmax loss only en-
sures that the features of a sample align well with its respec-
tive class prototype, without enforcing any explicit inter-
class separation or margin constraints. In pursuit of making
models robust against adversarial attacks, we propose to
maximally separate the intermediate feature representations
of different class samples. To this end, our training objective
is inspired from center loss [22], which clusters penulti-
mate layer features. We propose multiple novel constraints
(Sec. 3) to enhance between-class distances, and ensure
maximal separation of a sample from its non-true classes
(see Fig. 2). Our method is therefore fundamentally different
from [22], since the proposed multi-layered hierarchical
loss formulation and the notion of maximal separation has
not been previously explored for adversarial robustness.
Our experiments (Sec. 6.3) further show that the proposed
method significantly outperforms [22].
3 PROTOTYPE CONFORMITY LOSS
Below, we first introduce the notations used, then provide
a brief overview of the conventional cross entropy loss,
followed by a detailed description of our proposed method.
Notations: Let x ∈ Rm and y denote an input-label
pair and 1y be the one-hot encoding of y. We denote a
deep neural network (DNN) as a function Fθ(x), where
θ are the trainable parameters. The DNN outputs a
feature representation f ∈ Rd, which is then used by a
classification layer to perform multi-class classification. Let
k be the number of classes; the parameters of the classifier
can then be represented as W = [w1, . . . ,wk] ∈ Rd×k.
To train the model, we find the optimal θ and W that
minimize a given objective function. Next, we introduce a
popular loss function for deep CNNs.
Cross-entropy Objective: The cross-entropy objective func-
tion maximizes the dot product between an input feature
fi and its true class representative vector wy , such that
wy ∈W . In other words, cross-entropy forces the classifier
to learn a mapping from feature to output space such that
the projection onto the correct class vector is maximized:
LCE(x,y) =
r∑
i=1
− log exp(w
T
yifi + byi)∑k
j=1 exp(w
T
j fi + bj)
, (1)
where, r is the number of images, and fi is the feature of
an ith image xi with the class yi. W and b are, respectively,
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Fig. 2: Comparison between different training methods. The
red circle encompasses the adversarial sample space within a
perturbation budget ‖δ‖p < .
the weights and the bias terms for the classification layer.
Adversarial Perspective: The main goal of an attack algo-
rithm is to force a trained DNN Fθ to make wrong predic-
tions. Attack algorithms seek to achieve this goal within a
minimal perturbation budget. The attacker’s objective can
be represented by:
argmax
δ
L(x+ δ,y), s.t., ‖δ‖p < , (2)
where y is the ground-truth label for an input sample x, δ
denotes the adversarial perturbation, L(·) denotes the error
function, ‖ · ‖p denotes the p-norm, which is generally
considered to be an `∞-ball centered at x, and  is the
available perturbation budget.
In order to create a robust model, the learning algorithm
must consider the allowed perturbations in the input do-
main and learn a function that maps the perturbed images
to the correct class. This can be achieved through the fol-
lowing min-max (saddle point) objective that minimizes the
empirical risk in the presence of perturbations:
min
θ
E
(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ
L(x+ δ,y;θ)], s.t., ‖δ‖p < , (3)
where D is the data distribution.
CE Loss in Adversarial Settings: The CE loss is the de-
fault choice for conventional classification tasks. However,
it simply assigns an input sample to one of the pre-defined
classes. It therefore does not allow one to distinguish be-
tween normal and abnormal inputs (adversarial perturba-
tions in our case). Further, it does not explicitly enforce
any margin constraints amongst the learned classification
regions. It can be seen from Eq. 3 that an adversary’s job
is to maximize L(·) within a small perturbation budget .
Suppose, the adversarial polytope in the output space1 with
respect to an input sample x is given by:
P(x; θ) = {Fθ(x+ δ) s.t., ‖δ‖p ≤ }. (4)
An adversary’s task is easier if there is an overlap between
the adversarial polytopes for different input samples
belonging to different classes.
Definition 1: The overlap Oi,j between polytopes for each data
sample pair (i, j) can be defined as the volume of intersection
between the respective polytopes:
Oi,j = P(xiyi ; θ) ∩ P(xjyj ; θ).
1. Note that the output space in our case is not the final prediction
space, but the intermediate feature space.
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Fig. 3: An illustration of our training with deep supervision of distance-based loss functions LDist. Gφ(·) is an auxiliary branch to
map features to a low-dimensional output, which is then used as the loss in Eq. 9.
Note that the considered polytopes can be non-convex as
well. However, the overlap computation can be simplified
for convex polytopes [40].
Proposition 1: For an ith input sample xiyi with class label yi,
reducing the overlap Oi,j between its polytope P(xiyi ; θ) and
the polytopes of other class samples P(xjyj ; θ), s.t., yj 6= yi
will result in lower adversary success for a bounded perturbation
‖δ‖p ≤ .
Proposition 2: For a given adversarial strength , assume λ
is the maximum distance from the center of the convex polytope
to its outer boundary. Then, a classifier maintaining a margin
m > 2λ between two closest samples belonging to different
classes will result in a decision boundary with guaranteed
robustness against perturbation within the budget .
In other words, if the adversarial polytopes for samples
belonging to different classes are non-overlapping, the
adversary cannot find a viable perturbation within the
allowed budget. We propose that an adversary’s task
can be made difficult by including a simple maximal
separation constraint in the objective of deep networks.
The conventional CE loss does not impose any such
constraint, which makes the resulting models weaker
against adversaries. A more principled approach is to
define convex category-specific classification regions for
each class, where any sample outside all of such regions
is considered an adversarial perturbation. Consequently,
we propose the Prototype Conformity Loss (PCL) function,
described below.
Proposed Objective: We represent each class with its proto-
type vector, which represents the training examples of that
class. Each class is assigned a fixed and non-overlapping p-
norm ball and the training samples belonging to a class i are
encouraged to be mapped close to its hyper-ball center:
LPC(x,y) =
∑
i
{
‖fi −wcyi‖22 −
1
k − 1
∑
j 6=yi
(
‖fi −wcj‖22
+ ‖wcyi −wcj‖22
)}
. (5)
The gradients for the PCL can be computed as:
∂LPC
∂fi
= 2
(
fi −wcyi −
1
k − 1
∑
j 6=yi
fi −wcj
)
. (6)
During model inference, a feature’s similarity is com-
puted with all the class prototypes and it is assigned the
closest class label if and only if the sample lies within its
decision region:
yˆi = argmin
j
‖fi −wcj‖. (7)
Here, wc denotes the trainable class centroids. Note
that the classification rule is similar to the Nearest Class
Mean (NCM) classifier [41], but we differ in some important
aspects: (a) the centroids for each class are not fixed as the
mean of training samples, but are instead learned automat-
ically during representation learning, (b) class samples are
explicitly forced to lie within respective class norm-balls,
(c) feature representations are appropriately tuned to learn
discriminant mappings in an end-to-end manner, and (d)
to avoid inter-class confusions, disjoint classification regions
are considered by maintaining a large distance between each
pair of prototypes. We also experiment with the standard
softmax classifier and retain the same as the nearest proto-
type rule mentioned above.
Deeply Supervised Learning: The overall loss function
used for training our model is given by:
L(x,y) = LCE(x,y) + LPC(x,y). (8)
The above loss enforces intra-class compactness and inter-
class separation using learned prototypes in the output
space. In order to achieve a similar effect in the intermediate
feature representations, we include other auxiliary loss func-
tions {Ln} along the depth of our deep networks, which
act as companion objective functions for the final loss. This
is achieved by adding an auxiliary branch Gφ(·) after the
defined network depth, which maps the features to a lower
dimension output, and is then used in the loss definition.
For illustration, see Fig. 3.
Ln(x,y) = LCE(f l,y) + LPC(f l,y) (9)
s.t., f l = Glφ(F lθ(x)). (10)
5These functions reinforce the desired intra-class separa-
tion in the feature space at several intermediate layers of the
deep network.
4 STUDYING OTHER DISTANCE-BASED LOSSES
The separation in the feature space can be enforced
by any distance-based loss function in our proposed
deeply-supervised framework. In addition to our proposed
Prototype Conformity Loss (PCL), in this section, we
also study other distance-based loss functions, such as
center loss [22], contrastive loss [23] and triplet loss [24].
As we will demonstrate through quantitative results in
Sec. 6, other distance-based metrics also deliver strong
improvements compared to the traditional cross-entropy
loss; however, the best performance is achieved with the
proposed PCL.
Center Loss: Wen et al. [22] proposed center loss (LCL),
which discriminates the feature activations (fi) of the penul-
timate layer of a deep model, by learning class-wise centers:
LCL(x,y) = 1
2
m∑
i=1
‖fi − cyi‖22, (11)
where cyi denotes the yith class center of deep features.
During the course of training, the class-wise centers are
updated as follows:
ct+1j = c
t
j − α · ∇ctj (12)
where, ∇cj =
∑m
i=1 δ(yi = j) · (cj − fi)
1 +
∑m
i=1 δ(yi = j)
, (13)
where δ(·) is the delta function, and α is the learning rate
for updating the centers. The deep model is trained under
the joint supervision of the softmax loss and center loss,
with a hyper-parameter to balance the two supervision
signals. Intuitively, the softmax loss forces the deep features
of different classes to be apart. The center loss pulls the
deep features of the same class to their respective centers.
This joint supervision tends to maximize the inter-class
feature differences and reduce the intra-class variations.
Contrastive Loss: Hadsell et al. [23] proposed the contrastive
loss (LCo) to learn discriminative features for images. Dur-
ing training, an image pair is fed into the model with its
ground truth defined as 1 if both images belong to the
same class and 0 otherwise. In our experiments, we train
a Siamese network that takes a pair of images and trains
the embeddings at different layers of the network so that
the distance between them is minimized if they are from the
same class and is greater than some specified margin value
if they represent different classes. The loss is given by:
LCo(x0,x1,y) = 1
2
y‖f0 − f1‖22
+
1
2
(1− y){max(0,m− ‖f0 − f1‖2)}2. (14)
Here, m denotes the margin whose violation results in a
penalty.
Triplet Loss: Triplet loss was introduced by Schroff et al.
[24] and is commonly used in image retrieval. During the
training process, an image triplet (xa,xp,xn) is fed into the
model as a data sample, where xa,xp and xn are the anchor,
positive and negative images, respectively. The objective is
to learn embeddings such that the anchor is closer to the
positive example than the negative one. Formally, the triplet
loss is defined as:
LT(xa,xp,xn) = max(0,m+ ‖fa − fp‖22
− ‖fa − fn‖22. (15)
Here, m is a margin term used to stretch the gap between
similar and dissimilar pairs in the triplet and fa, fp and
fn are the intermediate feature embeddings for the anchor,
positive and negative images, respectively.
Next, we outline the adversarial attacks considered in
this work to defy our proposed defense mechanism, as well
as different existing state-of-the-art defenses.
5 ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
We evaluate our defense model against five recently
proposed state-of-the-art attacks, which are summarized
below, for completeness.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [2] generates an ad-
versarial sample xadv from a clean sample x by maximizing
the loss in Eq. 2. It finds xadv by moving a single step in the
opposite direction to the gradient of the loss function, as:
xadv = x+  · sign(∇xL(x,y)). (16)
Here,  is the allowed perturbation budget.
Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [12] is an iterative variant of
FGSM and generates an adversarial sample as:
xm = clip(xm−1 +

i
· sign(∇xm−1(L(xm−1,y))), (17)
where x0 is clean image x and i is the iteration number.
Momentum Iterative Method (MIM) [28] introduces an
additional momentum term to BIM to stabilize the direction
of gradient. Eq. 17 is modified as:
gm = µ · gm−1 + ∇xm−1L(xm−1,y)‖ ∇xm−1(L(xm−1,y)) ‖1
(18)
xm = clip(xm−1 +

i
· sign(gm)), (19)
where µ is the decay factor.
Carlini & Wagner Attack [26] defines an auxiliary variable
ζ and minimizes the objective function:
min
ζ
‖ 1
2
(tanh (ζ) + 1)− x ‖ +c · f(1
2
(tanh ζ + 1)), (20)
where 12 (tanh (ζ) + 1) − x is the perturbation δ, c is the
constant chosen and f(.) is defined as:
f(xadv) = max(Z(xadv)y −max{Z(xadv)k : k 6= y},−κ).
(21)
Here, κ controls the adversarial sample’s confidence and
Z(xadv)k are the logits values corresponding to a class k.
6Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [17] is similar to BIM,
and starts from a random position in the clean image neigh-
borhood U(x, ). This method applies FGSM form iterations
with a step size of γ as:
xm =xm−1 + γ · sign(∇xm−1L(xm−1,y)). (22)
xm = clip(xm,xm − ,xm + ). (23)
It proves to be a strong iterative attack, relying on the first
order information of the target model.
6 EXPERIMENTS
Datasets and Models: We extensively evaluate the pro-
posed method on five datasets: MNIST, Fashion-MNIST
(F-MNIST), CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and Street-View House
Numbers (SVHN). For the MNIST and F-MNIST datasets,
the CNN model chosen has six layers, as in [22]. For
the CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and SVHN datasets, we use a
ResNet-110 model [42] (see Table 1). The deep features for
the prototype conformity loss are extracted from different
intermediate layers using an auxiliary branch, which maps
the features to a lower dimension output (see Fig. 3). We
first train for T
′
epochs (T
′
= 50 for F/MNIST, T
′
= 200 for
CIFAR-10/100 and SVHN) with LCE and then use the loss
in Eq. 9 for 300 epochs. A batch size of 256 and a learning
rate of 0.1 (×0.1 at T=200, 250) are used. Further training
details are summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Model training with Prototype Conformity Loss.
Input: Classifier Fθ(x), training data {x}, ground truth labels
{y}, trainable parameters θ, trainable class centroids
{wcj : j ∈ [1, k] }, perturbation budget , epochs T ,
number of auxiliary branches L.
Output: Updated parameters θ
1 Initialize θ in convolutional layers.
2 for t = 0 to T :
3 if t < T
′
:
4 Converge softmax objective, θ := argminθ LCE.
5 else:
6 Compute joint loss L = LCE + τ
∑L
l LPC
7 Compute gradients w.r.t. θ and x, ∇θL(x,y) and
∇xL(x,y) respectively.
8 Update model weights, θ := argminθ L.
9 Update class centroids wcj ∀ l
10 Generate adversarial examples as:
11 if FGSM: then xadv = x+  · sign (∇xL(x,y))
12 elif PGD: then xadv = clip (x,x− ,x+ )
13 Augment x with xadv
14 return θ
Hyper-parameters for Adversaries: For each dataset, the de-
tails on the hyper-parameters of various adversarial attacks
used in our implementations are given in Table 2.
6.1 Results and Analysis
White-Box vs Black-Box Settings: In an adversarial set-
ting, there are two main threat models: white-box attacks,
where the adversary possesses complete knowledge of the
target model, including its parameters, architecture and the
training method, and black-box attacks (transfer attack in our
case), where the adversary feeds perturbed images at test
time (which are generated without any knowledge of the
target model). We evaluate the robustness of our proposed
TABLE 1: Two network architectures: CNN-6 (MNIST, FM-
NIST) and ResNet-110 (CIFAR-10,100 and SVHN). Features
are extracted in CNN-6 (after Layer 3 and two FC layers)
and ResNet-110 (after Layer 3, 4 and FC layer) to impose the
proposed LPC. Auxiliary branches are shown in green color.
Layer # 6-Conv Model ResNet-110
1
[
Conv(32, 5× 5)
PReLu(2× 2)
]
×2 Conv(16, 3× 3) + BNReLU(2× 2)
2
[
Conv(64, 5× 5)
PReLu(2× 2)
]
×2
[ Conv(16, 1× 1) + BN
Conv(16, 3× 3) + BN
Conv(64, 1× 1) + BN
]
×12
3
[
Conv(128, 5× 5)
PReLu(2× 2)
]
×2
[ Conv(32, 1× 1) + BN
Conv(32, 3× 3) + BN
Conv(128, 1× 1) + BN
]
×12
GAP→ LPC (GAP→FC(512)→ LPC)
4 FC(512)→ LPC
[ Conv(64, 1× 1) + BN
Conv(64, 3× 3) + BN
Conv(256, 1× 1)+ BN
]
×12
GAP→ LPC
5 FC(64)→ LPC FC(1024)→ LPC
6 FC(10)→ LCE FC(100/10)→ LCE
TABLE 2: Adversarial settings of our experiments. α, µ, i
respectively denote the step-size, the decay-factor and the num-
ber of attack steps for a perturbation budge .
Attack Parameters `p Norm
FGSM i = 1 `∞
BIM α = /10, i = 10 `∞
MIM α = /10, i = 10, µ = 1.0 `∞
C&W learning rate = 0.01, i = 1000 `2
PGD α = /4, i = 10 `∞
defense against both white-box and black-box settings. Table 3
shows our results for the different attacks described in Sec. 5.
The number of iterations for BIM, MIM and PGD are set
to 10 with a step size of /10 for BIM and MIM and /4
for PGD. The iteration steps for C&W are 1, 000, with a
learning rate of 0.01. We report our model’s robustness with
and without adversarial training for standard perturbation
size, i.e.,  = 0.3 for F/MNIST and and  = 0.03 for the
CIFAR-10/100 and SVHN datasets.
Recent literature has shown the transferability of
adverserial attacks amongst deep models [2], [31], [43],
where adversarial images are effective even for the
models they were never generated on. An adversary can
therefore exploit this characteristic of deep models and
generate generic adversarial samples to attack unseen
models. Defense against black-box attacks is therefore
highly desirable for secure deployment of machine learning
models [27]. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our
proposed defense under black-box settings (specifically in a
transfer attack case), we generate adversarial samples using
a standard VGG-19 model (trained on clean images only),
and feed them to the model trained using our proposed
strategy. Results in Table 3 show that black-box settings have
negligible attack potential against our model. For example,
on the CIFAR-10 dataset, where our model’s accuracy on
clean images is 91.89%, even the strongest iterative attack
(PGD-0.03) fails, and our defense retains an accuracy of
88.8%.
Adaptive White-box Attack: To be consistent with existing
defenses, our model performs conventional softmax predic-
7TABLE 3: Robustness of our model in white-box and black-box settings. Adversarial samples generated in the black-box settings (i.e.,
transfer attack) show negligible attack potential against our models. Here  is the perturbation size and c is the initial constant for
C&W attack. It can be seen that AdvTrain further complements the robustness of our models.
White-Box Setting Black-Box Setting
Training No Attack FGSM BIM C&W MIM PGD FGSM BIM C&W MIM PGD
MNIST ( = 0.3, c = 10)
Softmax 98.71 4.9 0.0 0.2 0.01 0.0 23.0 17.8 20.9 14.8 11.9
Ours 99.53 31.1 23.3 29.1 24.7 19.9 78.3 72.7 77.2 74.5 69.5
Ours + AdvTrainFGSM 99.44 53.1 36.6 40.9 37.0 34.5 85.6 81.0 82.3 81.4 78.2
Ours + AdvTrainPGD 99.28 49.8 40.3 46.0 41.4 39.8 85.2 81.9 83.5 82.8 80.8
CIFAR-10 ( = 0.03, c = 0.1)
Softmax 90.80 21.4 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.01 39.0 30.1 31.8 30.9 29.1
Ours 90.45 67.7 32.6 37.3 33.2 27.2 85.5 83.7 83.3 81.9 76.4
Ours + AdvTrainFGSM 91.28 75.8 45.9 5.7 44.7 42.5 88.9 87.6 87.4 88.2 84.5
Ours + AdvTrainPGD 91.89 74.9 46.0 51.8 49.3 46.7 88.5 88.3 88.2 88.5 88.8
CIFAR-100 ( = 0.03, c = 0.1)
Softmax 72.65 20.0 4.2 1.1 3.52 0.17 40.9 34.3 37.1 35.5 30.7
Ours 71.90 56.9 28.0 31.1 28.7 25.9 65.3 64.5 64.1 64.8 62.8
Ours + AdvTrainFGSM 69.11 61.3 32.3 35.2 33.3 31.4 66.1 65.2 65.7 65.5 63.4
Ours + AdvTrainPGD 68.32 60.9 34.1 36.7 33.7 36.1 65.9 66.1 66.7 66.1 66.7
F-MNIST ( = 0.3, c = 10)
Softmax 91.51 8.7 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 46.7 29.3 30.8 29.5 26.0
Ours 91.32 29.0 22.0 23.9 21.8 20.3 84.8 79.0 79.2 78.4 76.3
Ours + AdvTrainFGSM 91.03 55.1 37.5 41.7 40.6 35.3 89.1 87.0 87.7 87.9 85.2
Ours + AdvTrainPGD 91.30 47.2 40.1 44.6 41.3 40.7 88.2 88.0 88.2 88.3 89.7
SVHN ( = 0.03, c = 0.1)
Softmax 93.45 30.6 6.2 7.1 7.3 9.6 48.1 30.3 31.4 33.5 21.5
Ours 94.36 69.3 37.1 39.2 41.0 33.7 77.4 73.1 76.4 74.0 70.1
Ours + AdvTrainFGSM 94.18 80.1 47.4 51.9 45.6 40.5 90.1 87.4 88.0 87.6 84.4
Ours + AdvTrainPGD 94.36 76.5 48.8 54.8 47.1 47.7 88.7 88.2 89.2 88.6 89.3
tion at inference time. The reported results in Table 3 are
therefore for robustness against standard white-box attack
settings (where the adversarial samples are generated by
maximizing the softmax loss only). Here, we also experi-
ment in an adaptive white-box setting, where the attack is
performed on the joint PC+CE loss as per Eq. 8. This means
that the adversary now has access to the learned class
prototypes that are specific to our proposed training regime.
Results in Table 4 indicate a negligible performance drop in
under adaptive white-box settings.
TABLE 4: Robustness in adaptive white-box attack settings.
The performances for conventional attacks (where CE is the
adversarial loss) are shown in blue. ∗ indicates adversarially
trained models.
Training No Attack FGSM BIM MIM PGD
CIFAR-10 ( = 0.03)
Ours 90.45 66.90 (67.7) 31.29 (32.6) 32.84 (33.2) 27.09 (27.2)
Ours∗FGSM 91.28 74.24 (75.8) 44.05 (45.9) 43.77 (44.7) 41.32 (42.5)
Ours∗PGD 91.89 74.31 (74.9) 44.85 (46.0) 47.31 (49.3) 44.75 (46.7)
F-MNIST ( = 0.3)
Ours 91.32 28.1 (29.0) 21.7 (22.0) 20.3 (21.8) 19.5 (20.3)
Ours∗FGSM 91.03 53.3 (55.1) 36.0 (37.5) 39.3 (40.6) 34.7 (35.3)
Ours∗PGD 91.30 46.0 (47.2) 40.1 (40.1) 40.7 (41.3) 39.7 (40.7)
Adversarial Training (AdvTrain) has been shown to
enhance many recently proposed defense methods [44]. We
also evaluate the impact of AdvTrain in conjunction with
our proposed defense. For this, we jointly train our model
on clean and attacked samples, which are generated using
FGSM [2] and PGD [17] by uniformly sampling  from an
interval of [0.1, 0.5] for MNIST and F-MNIST and [0.01,
0.05] for CIFAR and SVHN. Results in Table 3 indicate that
AdvTrain further complements our method and provides
an enhanced robustness under both black-box and white-box
attack settings.
6.2 Comparison with Existing Defenses
We compare our method with recently proposed state-of-
the-art proactive defense mechanisms, which alter the net-
work or use modified training loss functions. To this end,
we compare with [31], which injects adversarial examples
into the training set and generates new samples at each
iteration. We also compare with [16], which introduces an
Adaptive Diversity Promoting (ADP) regularizer to improve
adversarial robustness. Further, we compare with an input
gradient regularizer mechanism [33] that penalizes the de-
gree to which input perturbations can change a model’s
predictions by regularizing the gradient of the cross-entropy
loss. Finally, we compare with the current state-of-the-art
Min-Max optimization based defense [17], which augments
the training data with adversarial examples, causing the
maximum gradient increments to the loss within a specified
l∞ norm. The results in Tables 5 , 6 and 7 in terms of re-
tained classification accuracy on different datasets show that
our method significantly outperforms all existing defense
schemes by a large margin. The performance gain is more
pronounced for the strongest iterative attacks (e.g. C&W
and PGD) with large perturbation budget . For example,
our method achieves a relative gain of 20.6% (AdvTrain
models) and 41.4% (without AdvTrain) compared to the
2nd best methods on the CIFAR-10 and MNIST datasets,
respectively, for the PGD attack. On the CIFAR-100 dataset,
for the strongest PGD attack with  = 0.01, the proposed
method achieves 38.9% compared with 18.3% by ADP [16],
which, to the best of our knowledge, is the only method
in the literature evaluated on the CIFAR-100 dataset. Our
results further indicate that adversarial training consistently
8TABLE 5: Comparison on CIFAR-10 dataset for white-box adversarial attacks (numbers shows robustness, higher is better). ∗ sign
denotes adversarially trained models. For our model, we report results without adversarial training (Ours) and with adversarially
generated images from FGSM (Ours∗f ) and PGD (Ours
∗
p ) attacks.
Attacks Params. Baseline AdvTrain [31]∗ Yu et al. [45]∗ Ross et al. [33]∗ Pang et al. [16]∗ Madry et al. [17]∗ Ours Ours∗f Ours
∗
p
No Attack - 90.8 84.5 83.1 86.2 90.6 87.3 90.5 91.3 91.9
FGSM  = 0.02 36.5 44.3 48.5 39.5 61.7 71.6 72.5 80.8 78.5
 = 0.04 19.4 31.0 38.2 20.8 46.2 47.4 56.3 70.5 69.9
BIM  = 0.01 18.5 22.6 62.7 19.0 46.6 64.3 62.9 67.9 74.5
 = 0.02 6.1 7.8 39.3 6.9 31.0 49.3 40.1 51.2 57.3
MIM  = 0.01 23.8 23.9 - 24.6 52.1 61.5 64.3 68.8 74.9
 = 0.02 7.4 9.3 - 9.5 35.9 46.7 42.3 53.8 60.0
C&W
c = 0.001 61.3 67.7 82.5 72.2 80.6 84.5 84.3 91.0 91.3
c = 0.01 35.2 40.9 62.9 47.8 54.9 65.7 63.5 72.9 73.7
c = 0.1 0.6 25.4 40.7 19.9 25.6 47.9 41.1 55.7 60.5
PGD  = 0.01 23.4 24.3 - 24.5 48.4 67.7 60.1 68.3 75.7
 = 0.02 6.6 7.8 - 8.5 30.4 48.5 39.3 50.6 58.5
TABLE 6: Comparison on MNIST dataset for white-box adversarial attacks (numbers shows robustness, higher is better). ∗ sign
denotes adversarially trained models. For our model, we report results without adversarial training (Ours) and with adversarially
generated images from FGSM (Ours∗f ) and PGD (Ours
∗
p ) attacks.
Attacks Params. Baseline AdvTrain [31]∗ Yu et al. [45] Ross et al. [33] Pang et al. [16] Madry et al. [17]∗ Ours Ours∗f Ours
∗
p
No Attack - 98.7 99.1 98.4 99.2 99.5 98.8 99.5 99.4 99.3
FGSM  = 0.1 58.3 73.0 91.6 91.6 96.3 97.3 97.1 97.2 96.5
 = 0.2 12.9 52.7 70.3 60.4 52.8 96.4 70.6 80.0 77.9
BIM  = 0.1 22.5 62.0 88.1 87.9 88.5 - 90.2 92.0 92.1
 = 0.15 12.2 18.7 77.1 32.1 73.6 - 76.3 76.5 77.3
MIM  = 0.1 58.3 64.5 - 83.7 92.0 - 92.1 92.7 93.0
 = 0.15 16.1 28.8 - 29.3 77.5 - 77.7 80.2 82.0
C&W
c = 0.1 61.6 71.1 89.2 88.1 97.3 97.7 97.7 97.1 97.6
c = 1.0 30.6 39.2 79.1 75.3 78.1 93.4 80.4 87.3 91.2
c = 10.0 0.2 17.0 37.6 20.0 23.8 - 29.1 39.7 46.0
PGD  = 0.1 50.7 62.7 - 77.0 82.8 95.4 83.6 93.7 93.9
 = 0.15 6.3 31.9 - 44.2 41.0 93.7 62.5 78.8 80.2
TABLE 7: Comparison on CIFAR-100 dataset for white-box ad-
versarial attacks (numbers shows robustness, higher is better).
∗ sign denotes adversarially trained models. For our model,
we report results without adversarial training (Ours) and with
adversarially generated images from FGSM (Ours∗f ) and PGD
(Ours∗p ) attacks.
Attacks Params. Baseline ADP [16] Ours Ours∗f Ours
∗
p
No Attack - 72.6 70.2 71.9 69.1 68.3
BIM  = 0.005 21.6 26.2 44.8 55.1 55.7
 = 0.01 10.1 14.8 39.8 46.2 46.9
MIM  = 0.005 24.2 29.4 46.1 56.7 57.1
 = 0.01 11.2 17.2 40.6 43.8 45.9
PGD  = 0.005 26.6 32.1 42.2 53.6 55.0
 = 0.01 11.7 18.3 38.9 40.1 44.0
complements our method and augments its performance
across all evaluated datasets.
Additionally, we compare our model’s performance with
a similar method proposed by Song et al. [46] in Table 8. The
results indicate that our proposed approach outperforms
[46] by a significant margin. Besides, a clear improvement
in the performance, there are several other distinguishing
features from [46] as follows: (a) Our approach is based
on a “deeply-supervised” loss that prevents changes to the
outputs within the limited perturbation budget. This super-
vision paradigm is the main contributing factor behind our
improved results (see Table 11). (b) [46] focuses on domain
adaption between adversarial and natural samples without
any constraint on the intermediate feature representations.
In contrast, we explicitly enforce the hidden layer activa-
tions to be maximally separated in our network design.
(c) [46] only considers adversarially trained models, while
we demonstrate clear improvements both with and without
adversarial training (a more challenging setting). For a fair
comparison, we have followed the exact model settings used
in [46] for the results reported in Table 8.
TABLE 8: Comparison of our approach with [46] on 4 datasets.
Dataset Method Clean FGSM MIM PGD
F-MNIST ( = 0.1) [46] 85.5 78.2 68.8 68.6Ours 91.3 86.6 80.1 79.4
SVHN ( = 0.02) [46] 82.9 57.2 53.9 53.2Ours 94.4 87.1 82.2 80.7
CIFAR-10 ( = 4/255) [46] 84.8 60.7 59.0 58.1Ours 91.9 85.3 70.1 69.4
CIFAR-100 ( = 4/255) [46] 61.6 29.3 27.3 26.2Ours 71.9 49.1 40.7 38.6
6.3 Comparison with Other Distance-based Losses
Here, we report performances when other distance-based
loss functions are used within our proposed deeply-
supervised framework. In this case, the proposed PCL is re-
placed with popular loss functions that directly incorporate
distance metrics, e.g. center loss, contrastive loss and triplet
loss. For a fair comparison, we train the same model using
cross-entropy (LCE), center loss (LCL) [22], contrastive loss
(LCo) [23] and triplet loss (LT) [24] applied after different
layers (similar to our LPC loss), and evaluate robustness
against different white-box attack settings. For LCL [22] and
LPC, the models are trained jointly with LCE in the last layer.
Table 10 provides architectural details of the model used for
results reported in Table 9. For the deeply supervised Soft-
max loss, the cross-entropy loss LCE is deployed after layers
3, 4 and 5 in conjunction with additional fully connected
and global average pool (GAP) layers, as shown in Table 10.
Similarly, for the deeply supervised center loss, the center
loss LCL is applied after layers 3, 4 and 5. Note that LCL is
9TABLE 9: Comparison of adversarial robustness for various loss functions (center loss, contrastive loss and triplet loss) on the
CIFAR-10 & 100 datasets. It can be seen that deep supervision of distance based loss functions consistently achieve superior
performance against various types of adversarial attacks. The proposed prototype conformity loss achieves the best performance
overall.
Attack Softmax Ours-Center [22] Ours-Contrastive [23] Ours-Triplet [24] Ours-PCL
CIFAR-10
Clean 90.80 86.29 86.9 89.75 90.45
FGSM ( = 8/255) 21.4 27.38 59.3 63.90 67.7
BIM ( = 8/255) 0.0 9.4 28.4 31.04 32.6
MIM ( = 8/255) 0.0 9.6 29.0 31.80 33.2
PGD ( = 8/255) 0.0 6.93 24.5 25.51 27.2
CIFAR-100
Clean 72.6 67.8 67.1 68.1 71.9
FGSM ( = 8/255) 20.0 17.8 21.9 24.3 56.9
BIM ( = 8/255) 4.2 9.8 13.0 15.3 28.0
MIM ( = 8/255) 3.5 8.9 13.5 15.9 28.7
PGD ( = 8/255) 0.2 6.1 9.0 9.1 25.9
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Fig. 4: t-SNE visualization of 10 classes for the last layer feature embeddings from model trained using Prototype Conformity
Loss (left) and Triplet Loss (right) for CIFAR-100 dataset. The class-wise feature space embeddings for our loss are better separated
than for other distance-based metrics for hard datasets like CIFAR-100.
applied jointly with LCE, as recommended in the original
paper. For the deeply supervised contrastive loss LCo and
triplet loss LT, the loss function is applied after layers 3, 4
and 5 as shown in Table 10. Note that there is no final fully
connected (FC-10) layer at the end in LCo and LT training.
Results Comparison: Table 9 provides a comparison of our
loss function with various other deeply supervised loss
functions. The results indicate a clear advantage of our
proposed LPC and other distance-based loss functions, com-
pared with the standard cross-entropy loss. For CIFAR-10,
distance based losses, namely center, contrastive and triplet
losses, have a comparable performance to PCL; however,
as the number of classes in the training dataset increases
(CIFAR-100), robustness against adversarial attacks for the
former drastically drops. Among the distance-based loss
functions, the proposed PCL shows a consistently better
performance, even for harder datasets like CIFAR-100. We
attribute this to the inclusion of contrastive constraints
within our proposed loss formulation, which jointly con-
sider the samples in a batch to enforce separation (see Fig. 6
for visualization of our training process with PCL).
PCL vs Triplet Loss: To better understand the effectiveness
of our proposed PCL compared to the deeply supervised
triplet loss, we visualize the last layer test features of a
sample of 10 classes (randomly picked) in Fig. 4 for the
CIFAR-100 dataset. Although both loss functions achieve
a comparable performance on clean test images (68.1%
for Triplet Loss and 71.9% for PCL), our method shows
enhanced robustness against strong iterative white-box at-
tacks where other distance-based loss functions fail. This is
achieved by the explicitly included contrastive constraints
in PC Loss.
6.4 Ablation Analysis
LPC at Different Layers: We investigate the impact of
our proposed prototype conformity loss (LPC) at different
depths of the network. Specifically, as shown in Table 11,
we apply LPC individually after each layer (see Table 1
for architectures) and in different combinations. We report
the achieved results on the CIFAR-10 dataset for clean
and perturbed samples (using FGSM and PGD attacks) in
Table 11. The network without any LPC loss is equivalent
to a standard softmax trained model. It achieves good
performance on clean images, but fails under both white-box
and black-box attacks (see Table 3). The models with LPC
loss in early layers are unable to separate deep features
class-wise (also visualized in Fig. 5) , thereby resulting in
inferior performance. Our proposed LPC loss has maximum
impact in the deeper layers of the network. This justifies our
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TABLE 10: ResNet-110 network architecture used for deep Soft-
max supervision (LCE) and deep center loss (LCL), contrastive
loss (LCo) or triplet loss (LT) supervision for CIFAR-10 dataset.
All these distance-based loss functions are denoted with (LDist)
below. Auxiliary branches are shown in green color.
Layer #
ResNet-110 ResNet-110
Center/Contrastive/TripletSoftmax Supervision Loss Supervision
1 Conv(16, 3× 3) + BNReLU(2× 2)
Conv(16, 3× 3) + BN
ReLU(2× 2)
2
[ Conv(16, 1× 1) + BN
Conv(16, 3× 3) + BN
Conv(64, 1× 1) + BN
]
×12
[ Conv(16, 1× 1) + BN
Conv(16, 3× 3) + BN
Conv(64, 1× 1) + BN
]
×12
3
[ Conv(32, 1× 1) + BN
Conv(32, 3× 3) + BN
Conv(128, 1× 1) + BN
]
×12
[ Conv(32, 1× 1) + BN
Conv(32, 3× 3) + BN
Conv(128, 1× 1) + BN
]
×12
(GAP→FC(512)→FC(10)→ LCE) (GAP→FC(512)→ LDist)
4
[ Conv(64, 1× 1) + BN
Conv(64, 3× 3) + BN
Conv(256, 1× 1)+ BN
]
×12
[ Conv(64, 1× 1) + BN
Conv(64, 3× 3) + BN
Conv(256, 1× 1)+ BN
]
×12
(GAP→ FC(10)→ LCE) GAP→ LDist
5 GAP→FC(1024)→FC(10)→ LCE FC(1024)→ LDist
6 - FC(10)→ LCE (only for Center Loss)
TABLE 11: Ablation Analysis with LPC applied at different
layers of ResNet-110 (Table 1) for CIFAR-10 dataset.
No Attack FGSM PGDLayer #
 = 0  = 0.03  = 0.03
None 90.80 21.40 0.01
Layer 1 74.30 23.71 0.01
Layer 2 81.92 30.96 8.04
Layer 3 88.75 33.74 10.47
Layer 4 90.51 39.90 11.90
Layer 5 91.11 47.02 13.56
Layer 4+5 90.63 55.36 20.70
Layer 3+4+5 90.45 67.71 27.23
choice of different layers for LPC loss, indicated in Table 1.
Feature Space Visualizations: We visualize the 2-D t-SNE
plots of features obtained from Layer 1, 3, 4 and 5 of our
best model for the MNIST, CIFAR-10 and SVHN datasets
in Fig. 5. We can see that, for deeper layers, feature clusters
are more separable, with enhanced intra-class compactness,
thereby reducing the polytope overlap of different classes,
leading to a lower adversary success for a bounded
perturbation ‖δ‖p ≤ .
Illustration of Learning Process: Fig. 6 illustrates the
gradual progression of our learning process, by visualizing
the class-wise 2-D deep features after different epochs.
These features are plotted by reducing the dimensions
of the penultimate layer to two neurons, and training
the model for 300 epochs, with a learning rate of 0.1
(×0.1 at epochs 122 and 250). We note the following: (i)
our proposed loss gradually causes the learnt features to
become more discriminative and well seperated, (ii) the
inter-class distances gradually increase over the course of
training, making it harder for an adversary to cross the
decision boundary within the specified perturbation budget
. These observations provide evidence that introducing the
proposed LPC at multiple layers enhances discrimination
and improves model performance.
Timing Comparison for Various Training Losses: Compar-
TABLE 12: Comparison of various loss functions (cross-
entropy, center, contrastive, triplet and prototype conformity
loss) on the basis of training time taken per epoch (seconds)
and the number of epochs required during training to achieve
the robustness stated in Table 9 for the CIFAR-10 dataset.
Parameter LCE LCL [22] LCo [23] LT [24] LPC
Time per epoch 25.9 102.0 133.5 138.1 102.9
Number of epochs 164 300 400 400 300
TABLE 13: Transferability Test on CIFAR-10: PGD adversaries
are generated with  = 0.03, using the source network, and
then evaluated on target model. Underline denotes robustness
against white-box attack. Note that adversarial samples gener-
ated on our model are highly transferable to other models as
black-box (transfer) attacked images.
Source
Target VGG-19 AdvTrain [31] Madry et al. [17] Ours
VGG-19 0.00 16.20 52.71 88.80
AdvTrain [31] 12.43 0.00 49.80 72.53
Madry et al. [17] 58.91 67.32 43.70 71.72
Ours 50.31 61.02 66.70 49.10
ing the time taken per epoch during training for various
distance-based loss functions can give us further insights
into the effectiveness of the method. In the cases of the
contrastive and triplet losss, the training time is higher
due to the formation of pairs and triplets, respectively (see
Table 12). Our Prototype Conformity Loss not only achieves
higher levels of robustness compared to other methods but
also requires a shorter training time. In Table 12, we also
show the number of epochs required when training a model
to achieve the robustness mentioned in Table 9. It can be
seen that, in the case of the contrastive and the triplet
losses, a greater number of epochs is required to effectively
separate the intermediate feature embeddings in order to
achieve adversarial robustness.
6.5 Transferability Test
We investigate the transferability of PGD adversaries on the
CIFAR-10 dataset between a standard VGG-19 model, ad-
versarially trained VGG-19 [31], Madry et al.’s [17] and our
model. We report the accuracy of target models (columns)
on adversarial samples generated from source models
(rows) in Table 13. Our results yield the following findings:
Improved black-box robustness: As noted in [19], a model
that gives a false sense of security due to obfuscated gra-
dients can be identified if the black-box attacks are stronger
than the white-box ones. In other words, the robustness of
such a model under white-box settings is higher than under
black-box settings. It was shown in [19] that most of the
existing defenses suffer from obfuscated gradients. Madry
et al.’s approach [17] was endorsed by [19] to not cause
obfuscated gradients. The comparison in Table 13 shows
that our method outperforms [17].
Similar architectures increase transferability: Changing
the source and target network architectures decreases the
transferability of an attack. The same architectures (e.g.
VGG-19 and its AdvTrain counterpart, as in Table 13) show
increased robustness against black-box attacks generated
from each other.
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Fig. 5: t-SNE plots of features at different layers, where LPC is applied, on MNIST (top), CIFAR-10 (middle) and SVHN (bottom)
datasets. The inter-class distances and intra-class compactness (denoted by red arrows and brown circles, respectively) increase
along the depth of the network. Best viewed in color.
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Fig. 6: Class-wise distribution of penultimate layer features (2 neurons only) on CIFAR-10 dataset. As the training progresses, the
class prototypes move farther away from each other, resulting in a guaranteed robustness against adversarial attacks. Best viewed
in color.
6.6 Identifying Obfuscated Gradients
Recently, Athalye et al. [19] were successful in breaking
several defense mechanisms in the white-box settings by
identifying that they exhibit a false sense of security. They
call this phenomenon gradient masking. Below, we discuss
how our defense mechanism does not cause gradient
masking on the basis of the characteristics defined in [19],
[47].
Iterative attacks perform better than one-step attacks: Our
evaluations in Fig. 7 indicate that stronger iterative attacks
(e.g. BIM, MIM, PGD) in the white-box settings are more
successful at attacking the defense models than single-step
attacks (FGSM in our case).
Robustness against black-box settings is higher than
white-box settings: In white-box settings, the adversary has
complete knowledge of the model, so attacks should be
more successful. In other words, if a defense does not suffer
from obfuscated gradients, robustness of the model against
white-box settings should be inferior to that in the black-box
settings. Our extensive evaluations in Table 3 show that the
proposed defense follows this trend and therefore does not
obfuscate gradients.
Increasing the distortion bound () decreases the ro-
bustness of defense: On increasing the perturbation size,
the success rate of the attack method should significantly
12
increase monotonically. For an unbounded distortion, the
classifier should exhibit 0% robustness to the attack, which
again is true in our case (see Fig. 7).
CIFAR-10 MNIST
Fig. 7: Robustness of our model (without adversarial training)
against white-box attacks for various perturbation budgets.
7 CONCLUSION
Our findings provide evidence that the adversary’s task
can be made difficult by incorporating a maximal separa-
tion constraint in the objective function of DNNs, which
conventional cross-entropy loss fails to impose. Our theory
and the experiments indicate that if the adversarial poly-
topes for samples belonging to different classes are non-
overlapping, the adversary cannot find a viable perturbation
within the allowed budget. We extensively evaluate the
proposed model against a diverse set of attacks (both single-
step and iterative) in black-box and white-box settings and
show that the proposed model maintains its high robust-
ness in all cases. Through empirical evaluations, we further
demonstrate that the achieved performance is not due to
obfuscated gradients, thus the proposed model can pro-
vide significant security against adversarial vulnerabilities
in deep networks.
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